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Abstract
Distributed consensus and Blockchains are popular among the
cryptocurrencies where no one except the coins users, owns the data
and transactions. No different to open source repositories, where the
data belongs to the users. In this work it is presented a manner of
having a repository for software packages in a Blockchain with dis-
tributed consensus, supported by the idea of the also demonstrated
proof-of-download.
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1 Introduction
A repository for packages is part of every Linux distribution. Having a repos-
itory is a manner to ensure easy update and installation for the system and
general end-user application packages. Software repositories are also utilized
in Mobile Phone application stores. The same model is also adopted to
search/download libraries for script languages or even browser extensions.
On retail stores the packages are only published given the discretion of
the store. The store is in charge to ensure the authenticity of the package,
sometimes the integrity or even the quality. Also, it guarantees the license
fee. Moreover, it protects against unauthorized use of the software.
Although the objective of every store is pretty similar, a package store
for an open source software platform has its nuances. Guaranteeing the
quality, authenticity and integrity are also requirements for the majority
of the distribution. However, transparency is a fundamental piece. The
packages are validated using web-of-trust [4], allowing the packages to be
distributed in different mirrors (trusted or not) as it is going to be also
validated on the endpoint where the installation is conditioned to validation.
Another facet that is very common on open source software is the sup-
port for third-party repositories. Generally supplied from a small group of
developers/users specifically to peers that demands, for whatever the reason,
a more frequently updated or even customized package. Those packages may
or may not be trusted by the distribution, but trusted by the end-user.
The central authority is presented in the software repository by the figure
of the distribution, which is placed in that role not only due to its responsibil-
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ity to vouch for the packages but also due to technical limitations on the way
the packages are shared and distributed. These technical limitations could
be circumvented with techniques already known and used in Blockchains
where a peer-to-peer network with no central authority manages to have a
consensus.
Here we wish to present a schema to implement a decentralized package
repository using Blockchain. As for the experiments, the focus will be given
on the open source repositories, given the easy access and accountability to
the data of the package.
This work is divided in the following sections: A introduction on
Blockchain (Section 2); Brief introduction on Distributed Consensus
(Section 3); Software repositories (Section 4); On Section 5 the problem
is better illustrated, while Section 6 presents a proposal followed by
the Experiment (Section 7) and finally the results (Section 8) which is
superseded by the conclusions (Section 9).
2 Blockchain
Blockchain consists in a sequence of blocks that always contains the crypto-
graphic hash of the previews block. The block hash took into consideration
the previous block hash. Therefore, validating one is also to validate its
predecessor, till the genesis block. The genesis Block is the first block of
a Blockchain. The connections between the different blocks in a Blockchain
are illustrated on Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Blockchain blocks structure. Every block contains the hash of its
predecessor.
The blocks are generated given a time beat, every N units of time a new
block is likely to be generated. The blocks do not only contain their meta
data but a payload. The payload is the data that is meaningful to the final
application, regardless of the Blockchain structure. In the case of Bitcoin,
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the payload is a Merkle tree containing all the transactions held in the given
block. A Merkle tree is a data structure that allows a rapid and inexpensive
check of Bitcoin transactions [12].
The time in between the blocks generation is not precise, as the generation
of a new block relies on the network consensus, which may be a resolution of a
cryptographic puzzle, explained on Section 3. On Figure 2 it is possible to
see the historical values of the amount of time that was necessary to generate
Bitcoin blocks [5]. In Bitcoin, the target is to have each block generated in
every 10 minutes [11].
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Figure 2: Amount of time in between Bitcoin blocks generation [5].
In Bitcoin the puzzle is adjusted according to the network power, the
difficulty is adjusted on every 2016 blocks (about two weeks). The difficult is
illustrated at Equation 1, where N is the new difficult, O is the old difficult
and T is the time that took to compute the last 2016 blocks.
N = O ∗ (2016 ∗ 10)/T (1)
One of the biggest advantages of the Blockchain is its decentralized na-
ture. It is possible to trust the Blockchain regardless of the channel of down-
load and the source. As by design, it is resistant to modification of the data.
It is ”an open, distributed ledger that can record transactions between two
parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way”. [9]
Once recorded, the data in any given block cannot be changed unless the
subsequent blocks are also changed.
Although the blocks have a single parent, it is possible that a block has
multiple children. Each of those child blocks refers to and contains the hash
of the same previews block. This scenario happens on a Blockchain fork,
which is when blocks are generated almost concurrently from two (or more)
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different peers. In the latter case, it is a temporary situation. A diverging
chain is illustrated on Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Hypothetical example of a Blockchain diverging at height 1 and 2;
Consensus found on 3.
The most popular use of the Blockchains are in cryptocurrencies 1. How-
ever, it is feasible to be used beyond that, in applications that are not cryp-
tocurrencies related.
2.1 Structure
The validation of the Blockchain is relatively inexpensive [1]. In order to
be validated, the hash of the block in question needs to be computed. If it
matches with a parent hash, every subsequent block is also validated.
A Blockchain is decentralized using a peer-to-peer network, where the
participants are authenticated by their collaboration power, mitigating the
possibility of infinite reproducibility, intrinsic to a digital asset [1].
In a Blockchain, there are two different ways to refer to a block: Block
Hash and Block Height. The block hash identifies the block uniquely and
unambiguously. The hash is a digital fingerprint of the block while the height
is a number that is given after the size of the Blockchain while the block was
generated being 0 the genesis block.
1cryptocurrency: Digital asset used as a medium of exchange which secures the trans-
actions using strong encryption as the example of the Bitcoin.
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Field Description
Version Version number of software/protocol.
Previous Block Hash The hash of the previous block.
Timestamp The time of the block creation.
Difficult Target The proof-of-work difficult target.
Nonce Number used on the block generation.
Merkle root The hash of the Merkle-Tree root.
Table 1: The anatomy of a block.
2.1.1 Block
In cryptocurrencies the block holds a Merkle tree [11] that contains the trans-
actions. Among of the payload, the block also includes metadata: time
stamping, the previous block hash, version of software/protocol, nonce and
difficult target and the Merkle root. Table 1 describes the fields utilized in
a Bitcoin block.
In case blocks are produced concurrently by different nodes, there is an
specific algorithm that will decide which chain is the valid one given the chain
history.
There is no guarantee that any particular entry will remain in the best
version of the history forever. As the incentives are made to extend new
blocks, in opposite to overwrite, it is unlikely that old blocks became orphan.
Orphan is the block that are not selected for inclusion in the main chain.
2.1.2 Hard forks
Whenever there is a change in the manner to generate new blocks, it is called
Hard Fork. A hard fork happens when the old method of validation can no
longer validate new blocks.
The Hard Fork is an essential mechanism to implement new features
and fixes in a Blockchain. If the nodes are not in agreement with the hard
fork, there will be a split where the Blockchain will assume two different
consensuses one for each version. Therefore two different Blockchains.
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3 Distributed Consensus
In a Blockchain there are different ways to generate a new block, depending
on the consensus algorithm utilized by the Blockchain’s peer-to-peer net-
work. The consensus mechanism needs to ensure that the decision upon the
last block is acceptable to all legit nodes as it will define the truth of the
Blockchain. This process of generating a new block is referred to as mining.
A valuable property that is in general likely to have in a Blockchain is
the capability to not concentrate the power into a selected peer or peers,
but make the network autonomous, without a central authority. Generally
speaking, the consensus mechanism should be secure enough that it is more
profitable to cooperate than it is to subvert.
As already demonstrated sometimes the consensus is not explicitly found
in a given height, but later it is established because overall is less cost-effective
to overwrite than to compute a new block.
The Proof-of-Work is the most famous method of authentication/mining.
It is the model adopted in the Bitcoin protocol [11].
3.0.1 Proof-of-Work (PoW)
In a Bitcoin network, a new block can be generated by any member of the
network. However, in order to generate this block, the member has to solve
a cryptographic puzzle.
The Proof-of-Work puzzle relies on a computation of a hash with partic-
ular characteristics, which are adjusted considering the possibility to find the
solution to the puzzle. The puzzle is expected to be solved giving a target:
the amount of time that is expected in between the blocks generation.
In order to encourage peers to participate in the mining business, there
is an incentive to the ones that generate the new block. The first transaction
in the block is a payment to the user who has generated the block. This
incentive is paid out in the format of tokens, which latter can be exchanged
for money the number of tokens halves on every 210,000 blocks. Eventually,
the value will be zero, and this incentive will no longer exist. There is also
an incentive to validate transactions.
In a Blockchain, there is no central authority. The consensus in the next
block is giving by simple rules that every node should follow. A mined block
that has not followed the rules is considered to be invalid, therefore likely to
be an orphan block. In Blockchain, there is no election or fixed moment where
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the consensus occurs. Instead, the consensus is achieved of the asynchronous
interaction of thousands of independent nodes, all following simple rules.
In order to better understand the Proof-of-work it is first necessary to un-
derstand cryptographic hashes. Those hashes are the representation of input
data of any size into a short string. There are, however, some characteristics
that are important in a cryptographic hash, including: Unfeasible to manip-
ulate a given content to generate a specific hash which will be considered
valid by the verification mechanism.
In sha256, a popular cryptographic hash algorithm, for any input given,
the output is a set of 256 bits. Virtually impossible to find two inputs that
lead to the same hash output. The Figure 4 exemplifies the output of a
sha256 hash. By changing the phrase a little bit, we will have a completely
different output. As demonstrated at Figure 5.
sha256(“Rocket Man”) = 
           “57f6e03588382e8d28f1c8f555ec1d677f7edac11afc29ce1228d3d715ead1cf“
Figure 4: Example of the sha256 output for the input ”Rocket Man”
sha256(“Rocket Man 1”) = 
           “3a39d36a80f495064bedcae3d464bb2d2a99d5e195ea019a67797f3b4bc9dbf5“
Figure 5: Example of the sha256 output for the input ”Rocket Man” added
the nonce 1.
In Figure 5 it was added a nonce to the string illustrated at Figure 4.
The nonce is commonly used in cryptography to avoid common hash output
due to very common input. With different nonce, the hash will be most likely
different.
To illustrate a puzzle, imagine if there is a need to find a hash where the
first character is zero. Given the data from the Figure 4 and Figure 5, it
is possible to change the nonce, until finding a hash that starts with zero.
That is a relatively easy task. It is possible to notice that the nonce 10 will
generate the hash output of Figure 6.
Considering the hash is evenly distributed, it is expected to
have a hash starting with 0 once every 16 hashes. In numerical
terms, that is the same to find a hash that has a value less than
0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000.
That is an example of a Bitcoin challenge target.
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sha256(“Rocket Man 10”) = 
           “05c54d35056b0dbf6a5fb77c7157aefdf729f2dd500393e473b25deaeda12b92“
sha256(“Rocket Man 9”) = 
           “5675850eeb360e7f6d020818e14a1db2168279768466e48bda0a7dc14d041337“
sha256(“Rocket Man 8”) = 
           “b59025c1d37b85355c42cfc79a04432aabe32771138bf906ac23df9b589efd6e“
sha256(“Rocket Man 11”) = 
           “1549499d25ca7d5c9b58bb201b405e28dbcb315d0f699ebc1ebabbec29b2e168“
sha256(“Rocket Man 12”) = 
           “6e5d9038ed793763e53d80a6e909920c81a88fd40220f8890a3134219929425e“
Figure 6: Example of the sha256 output for the input ”Rocket Man” added
the nonce 10.
Notice that the smaller the target is, the more difficult it is to find a hash
that has a value smaller than it. Once the nonce is found, anyone can rapidly
and inexpensively validate that the nonce meets the target.
Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work is very similar to the problem above; where the
input of the hash is given by the block herders components which include,
among of other things, the timestamp, nonce and Markle tree. The tar-
get/challenge is set by the network, considering the hash/power amount,
to probabilistic generates blocks in a near-fixed time amount. Figure 7
illustrates the difficulty to generate blocks in the history of the Bitcoin’s
Blockchain.
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Figure 7: Difficulty to generate Bitcoin blocks [5].
Although Proof-of-Work is the most popular method to authenticate the
peers in a Blockchain, there are alternatives such as the Proof-of-Stake.
3.0.2 Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
In Blockchain terms, Stake is what the user has and pledges in order to
participate on the decision on the next block. However, unlike the name
suggests the consensus is not arbitrated exclusively by the one who holds
9
more resources, but by a set of arbitration that decides to be not centralized
in one single peer. Instead, several methods have been devised.
In PoS the miner of a new block is known as the forger. Before the
selection, in order to participate in the selection party, the forger had to
deposit some tokens into the network, using it as collateral to vouch for the
block.
The more a user stakes, the better are the chances of being selected. An
eventually malicious user will not act against the network, as it compromises
the value of its tokens. Therefore, losing more money than possibly winning.
As mentioned, the key in this process is to select the right user to forge
the block. This semi-random selection could be based on different factors, in-
cluding Randomized block selection, Coin age-based selection, and Delegated
Proof-of-Stake.
Randomized block selection: In the Randomized block selection, the
forger is chosen based on a formula that combines the lowest hash value and
the size of the stake [10].
Coin age-based selection: A combination randomization with a ”coin
age” factor. The ”coin age” is determinate by the age of the coin times the
number of days that a coin has been held. Originally, coins that are older
than 30 days are eligible to compete in the next block generation. Older and
larger sets of coins have a greater probability of signing the next block. Once
the block is signed, the winning coins age is set to zero. Very old coins (older
than 90 days) are no eligible to sign a block [22].
Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS): In delegated Proof-of Stake the
nodes have a reputation based on Stake. Only the 21 most reputed nodes
can participate in the transaction validations and block generation. The
reputation may vary upon the time; nodes can lose or conquer reputation.[22].
3.0.3 Proof-of-Authority (PoA)
transactions and blocks are validated and approved by Validators. The Val-
idators are capable of adding data to blocks, using special software. Individ-
uals earn the right to become a validator based on reputation. In order to
keep being a validator the user most cooperate, as he/she can lose the status
out of a bad reputation [18].
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3.0.4 Proof-of-Space (PoSpace)
very similar to proof of work, except that instead of computation, storage is
used. Graph pebbling is one alternative for Proof-of-Space implementation.
It is a mathematical game and area of interest played on a graph with pebbles
on the vertices [7].
3.0.5 Ripple
Every few seconds all nodes run the Ripple consensus algorithm, maintaining
correctness and agreement on the network. Once the agreement is reached
the ledger is considered ”closed”. If there is no fork on the network, the
last-closed ledger maintained by all nodes in the network will be identical
[3].
3.0.6 AlgoRand
For AlgoRand decentralization means not to have to trust a centralized entity
as the single source of truth in the network. The responsibility to run and
maintain the network falls to ordinary users. For that AlgoRand utilizes the
Byzantine Agreement: a communication protocol that allows the users of a
distributed system to reach consensus in the presence of malicious actors.
3.1 Consensus Algorithms Comparison
All Consensus Algorithms have the same objective; however, the computa-
tion to achieve it varies a lot in between the different options. The main
characteristics that were considered in this work are: node anonymity, and
power consumption.
• node anonymity : The capability to join and exit the network without
identifying itself.
• power consumption: Some methods to achieve consensus demand much
computation in a not so efficient way, leading to an enormous amount
of energy spent.
The Table 2 contains a comparison of the different consensus algorithms
listed in this work.
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Property PoW PoS DPoS PoA PoSpace Ripple AlgoRand
Anonymous X X X – X X X
Power consumption High Fair Fair – Fair Low Low
Example Bitcoin [11] Peercoin [21] Bitshares [17] – SpaceMint [8] Ripple [13] AlgoRand
Table 2: Consensus Algorithms Comparison.
4 Software repository
Software repositories became the primary source for application installation
or even application marketing. It is emerged from Linux package repositories,
with later adoption by the smartphones, nowadays available in all platforms.
Many are the responsibilities/features of a package repository, including
ensuring that the package is trusted, not manipulated to include any vul-
nerability or malware. Not less important, the repository should guarantee
that there is no incompatibility among the provided packages, dependencies
should be resolved upon the installation act.
Some package repositories also impose Trusted Computing Base [16] by
generating signatures for each of the binaries although those are not so pop-
ular in the open source Linux repositories.
Distributed via untrusted methods such as Mirrors, the open source repos-
itories, rely on Web-Of-Trust in order to guarantee the integrity and authen-
ticity of the packages. It is likely that the user will use a Mirror closer to its
geographical location, therefore optimizing the download time. This mirror
is not necessarily trusted or secure.
Some distributions prioritize the newest packages over old stable packages.
Others also provide an alternative ”repository” for a set of software or even
let the user create and share their own packages via a personal repository [2].
In that case, the user who downloads the package has to trust the package
publisher, by accepting packages with her digital signature.
The timing to have the package published is sensitive, as updates may
contain a security fix or even an update that will restore the machine from
a failure. The timing, however, is not the only factor that is take into con-
sideration to classify a distribution quality.
In script language repositories, where the adoption and contributions are
more intensive, it is common to find orphan packages or even malicious soft-
ware with names that look like valid packages [15]. Mostly as a consequence
of earlier adoption. This fact reiterates the need for a figure that can bless
the packages. Still, this information can be provided without centralization.
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5 Problem
Having the schema of Mirrors, there is always a central repository to be
mirrored from; intrinsic creates a hierarchy dependency. This repository
hierarchy may delay the update of packages leading to circumstances where
the user may be vulnerable to a not-yet-updated critical software failure.
The distribution from third-party repositories is not concentrated in a
single information point, not allowing the user to search for extra packages.
The user has to obtain this information out-of-band, which may or not may
be trusted. It is not feasible to be indexed due to the large amount of data.
Having all packages updated to the latest version is natural. However, the
majority of the distributions do not have the support to upgrade or down-
grade the software up to a point in history. Having two identical platforms,
rolling back in time is not a trivial task. However, it may be useful partic-
ularly in cloud computing, where virtual machine deployments are frequent.
Fast code change, may lead to broken dependencies.
Concurrent trails of software may be a problem. A given package can
be supplied in two or more repository sources. Likely to happens on script
libraries where a package is supplied from the script repository and the dis-
tribution repository. In that case, files may clash leading to broken depen-
dencies, broken updates and so on.
6 Proposal
Concentrating every Linux distribution in a single package distribution
source, effectively solves some of the problems explained on section 5, as
the clash of packages or files could be identified and treated accordingly.
Having the package repository inside a Blockchain is a real benefit to the
user, given the possibility of having a decentralized model for updating the
packages moreover, a centralized source for the different trails.
The proposal in this work consists in a Blockchain capable of holding
packages information from different trails, this information can be later used
in package upgrades and downgrades, search and installation.
We present a Blockchain that does not have financial incentives to the
participants. The benefit, on the best interest of the distributions, is the pub-
lication of the packages. The packages are later consumed by the distribution
users, for every confirmed download a reward is granted to the associated dis-
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tribution. The interest to have a trustworthy source for packages is mutual
and interdependent.
Ultimately, the distributions with largest users base are the ones most
interested to keep the quality of the Blockchain, therefore trusted to forge new
blocks. The popularity factor is used to measure how large is a distribution
user base. The popularity factor is computed based on the reward given for
the distribution at every confirmed package download.
The concept presented in this work is somewhat similar to the concept of
Proof-of-Stake, where the Stake factor is the popularity given the amount of
downloads related to each distribution. Inside the Blockchain the distribution
will be called as Trail.
6.1 Trail
The Trail is the representation of a distribution. Multiple users can act on
behalf of a Trail. Within the Blockchain, it is possible to add, list, remove
users and packages from a given Trail. Similar to the packages information,
the user authorization is also hosted within the Blockchain. There are no
permissions levels detailed in this work, although it may be expanded to
support it in further versions.
An authorization is a grant to a public key. Whoever had the associated
private key will be able to manipulate the Trail, including the removal of its
participation on the Trail. New trails can be created; however, the creation
depends upon a process that is held on multiple Blocks of the Blockchain as
detailed on Creating a new Trail.
6.1.1 Creating a new Trail
Any member of the Blockchain can generate a new Trail, no authority is
needed to validate it or impose restrictions, although it will not be possible
to request a name that is already taken by another user. The ownership of
a name is only released via hard-fork, or if there isn’t a member to claim
for the name. A block that offers to a user a trail that is already taken, is
considered to be an invalid block; regardless of who offered it.
In order to avoid the massive generation of new Trails, each block can
only contain ten new Trails. The preference is given to the users that are
already part of a popular Trail (The concept of popularity will be explained
on subsection 6.3). The generation is also taken in two different blocks:
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request and response. In the request phase, the user asks the network for
the Trail, presenting her public key. If eligible to be in the next block, the
next block will contain a challenge that is encrypted and can only be read
by whoever has the corresponding private key. The second step is to provide
this result in the peer-to-peer network, in case the challenge is resolved, the
Trail will be published in the second block.
If everything proceeds with the regular flow (no exceptions), the Trail is
formalized, and at a third block, it will be possible to add more identities to
the Trail. The Figure 8 contains a flow that describes the creation of a new
Trail.
User p2p network
Request for a Trail
Archlinux
+ public key
Network propouse a challenge
Publish challenge resoults
Network publish the new Trail
Bl
oc
k 
N
Bl
oc
k 
N 
+ 
1
Figure 8: Diagram that illustrates the creation of a new Trail.
6.1.2 Deleting a Trail
The Trail is deleted whenever no more users are holding the ownership. If
that happens, the trail name will be vacant for the next user who claims it.
Notice that the packages blessed to a given trail are still valid, no matter if
valid users are holding the Trail authority or not.
6.1.3 Adding an user to a Trail
Adding a user to a trail is conditioned to:
• Someone who already have privileges on the given trail grants access
to a third user.
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• The third user in question accepts the invitation by solving a crypto-
graphic puzzle.
With these simple rules, it is possible to guarantee that Trails will not be
held by fake users (invalid), furthermore will not be taken by someone that
is not interested in having such access. The puzzle is a challenge-response
problem that depends on the user to use its private key. When added to a
Trail, the user is known as Trail member. Figure 9 illustrates the sequence
flow that describes the addition of an user to a Trail.
User p2p network
Request for add a new user
Network publish new user challange
New user solve the challenge 
Network publish the new User info
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+ 
1
New user
Figure 9: Sequence diagram that illustrates the addition of an user into a
Trail.
6.1.4 Removing an user from a Trail
Differently from adding a user to a Trail, to remove the user, there is no
puzzle. Instead, another member of the Trail, or the user itself, can publish
the removal information on the Blockchain.
Notice that it is technically possible to have a nested Trail. That may
happen when the Trail is held only by users that no longer have access to
their certificates. If that happens, the user won’t be able to remove himself
from the Trail. Figure 10 illustrates the sequence flow that describes the
removal of a user from a given Trail.
6.1.5 Trail, distributions and version names
There are Linux and packages distributions that do not have a version asso-
ciated with it. That is the case of ArchLinux, and PiPy; other distributions
such as Debian contain different releases with different packages set for each
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User p2p network
Request for remove a user
Network publish the user removal
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Figure 10: Sequence diagram that illustrates the removal of a user from a
Trail.
version. In this second case, it is recommended that the distribution have a
Trail for each version.
6.1.6 Adding packages to a Trail
There is no such thing as adding a package to a Trail. The package is added
to the Blockchain, and when added, a Trail member can vouch for it. The
vouch is a simple signature provided by any Trail member. The signature
consists in the package check sum and the Trail name. That will guarantee
that a given Trail trusts in the package as shown on Figure 11.
User p2p network
Package is announced
Package is published
Trail signature is added
Trail package is pubilshed
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Figure 11: Diagram that illustrates the addition of a package to the
Blockchain.
There is a limit of 100 packages to be published per block, the equation
gives the preference on how popular is the Trails that the user who is pub-
lishing the package is a member. Equation 2. The Preference is given as
the sum of the popularity of each Trail that the user is member.
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P =
t∑
n=0
t (2)
6.2 The block generation: consensus
Although a single entity will be responsible for generating a block, any mem-
ber of the Blockchain can validate the Block. A set of simple rules can be
used to determine if a block is valid or not, as listed below:
• The Block respects the limits on the number of new Trails and Pack-
ages.
• The Signature of the Trail members are valid, and the publishers are
indeed authorized to vouch for that Trail.
• The new Trail members request and removal match the signatures.
• The new Trail members have correctly solved the proposed puzzle.
All trail members are eligible to forge a Block. During the forging process,
a group of the most four popular Trails is selected. Each Trail is represented
by a randomly chosen member. One, out of those four, will be randomly
chosen to forge the Block.
6.3 Trail popularity: proof-of-download
The proof-of-download is utilized to ensure the popularity of a Trail. It
consists in a process to make sure that a client that is downloading a package
is a legitimate client, not an adversary trying to increase the popularity of
a given trail; in order to achieve this goal, there is a challenge posted to the
client. The challenge itself inputs a minimum overhead to the client and an
even smaller overhead to the provider.
The client has to:
• Inform the package name and trail;
• Download the package and challenge;
• Compute the hash of the downloaded package;
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• Give back the hash to the p2p network with challenge receipt;
• If valid, the network will give back the offset of chunk data that needs to
be removed from the downloaded package; In that case the download
count is increased. Anyone is able to validate the challenge. If the
challenge was already solved by a previous client, it won’t be summed.
• If not valid, it will be ignored.
Then every peer on the network, when receiving a request to deliver a
package has to:
• Open the file and tamper the package with random data.
• Compute the hash of the package.
• Delivery the package with the tampered content.
• Whenever it gets the request to validate a hash, validate and return
the data.
• Increment the ledger within the download numbers.
This number is volatile and held by the network; a snapshot of this num-
ber is published on every new Block. So, every node is fully aware of the
most popular Trails.
The popularity rate is directly proportional to the amount of downloads.
Every block computes the popularity considering: current download rate and
previous popularity. As expressed in the equation: Equation 3. P stands
for popularity while pp is previous popularity, cp is currently popularity,
and t is total amount of downloads.
P = ((pp/100) ∗ t) ∗ 0.3) + (cp ∗ 0.7) (3)
The number of downloads needs to be well computed as it may grant
access to the generation of the new Block. With that in mind, the net-
work imposes a challenge to every new download. The challenge consists of
tampering the original download file with a random set of bytes. Once the
tamper is made, the HASH of the package is computed.
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Once downloaded, the package needs to be verified by the client, once the
client got the hash, it gives it back to the network, which only presents the
tamper formula, if the hash is presented correctly.
In this scenario, fake clients need to download the package making it more
expensive than the challenge generation, therefore mitigating the possibility
of having fake downloads only to inflate those numbers. The cost of the chal-
lenge is inexpensive as the package needs integrity validation nevertheless.
7 Experiment
The experiment consists in a creation of a test Blockchain, where all packages
from the ArchLinux [19] distribution were placed, so that, it was possible to
understand the feasibility of haven a distribution in the proposed format.
With the experimental Blockchain, it is also possible to analyze factors such
as block size, perfect timing for block generation, and format and disposi-
tion of the data for the different Trails. Most importantly, the experiment
validates the rules proposed on section 6.2.
During the experiment, the signature creation was laid aside, since they
have been proved to work elsewhere [14]. Without the signature generation,
it was possible to drastically increase the simulation speed.
ArchLinux was chosen because it has the right balance on stability and
package update frequency. It also has a 3rd party repository AUR [2] which
will be handled in a further work.
The simulation deals with almost 5000 users publishing packages, over ten
years of ArchLinux package history. The simulation assumes the distribution
popularity based on educated random numbers.
During the simulation limits on the number of packages per block are
reached, and a consensus is eventually met.
The simulation software does not test the p2p network; rather, it tests
the manner in which to achieve consensus. Notice, however, that within the
block interval the package creation time is irrelevant, as the acknowledgment
of its existence to every peer. Therefore this experiment also proves (to some
degree) that the suggestions here are resilient to problems arising from the
network, be it intentionally caused by an eventual attacker or not.
The presence of a bad actor trying to subvert the consensus does not need
to be expressed, as every peer has its interest and advocate on its behalf, yet,
by the proposed rules a common consensus is meant to be met.
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All implementations created and used in this work are available on
GitHub licensed under GPL [23].
7.1 The Test Blockchain
In ArchLinux the package creation recipes are placed in a Git [6] repository
[20]. The package receipt contains all the information that is necessary to
validate the packages sources and compile them. This receipt format con-
tains variables and metadata that was interpreted in order to produce more
consistent results. In the Figure 12 there is an example of a PKGBUILD
file. Notice the hash for every relevant source in the package.
pkgname=openssh
pkgver=7.9p1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc=’Premier connectivity tool for remote login with the SSH protocol’
url=’https://www.openssh.com/portable.html’
license=(’custom:BSD’)
arch=(’x86_64’)
makedepends=(’linux-headers’)
depends=(’krb5’ ’openssl’ ’libedit’ ’ldns’)
optdepends=(’xorg-xauth: X11 forwarding’
’x11-ssh-askpass: input passphrase in X’)
validpgpkeys=(’59C2118ED206D927E667EBE3D3E5F56B6D920D30’)
source=("https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/
${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz"{,.asc}
’sshdgenkeys.service’
’sshd@.service’
’sshd.service’
’sshd.socket’
’sshd.conf’
’sshd.pam’)
sha256sums=(’6b4b3ba2253d84ed3771c8050728d597c91cfce898713beb7b64a305b6f11aad’
’SKIP’
’4031577db6416fcbaacf8a26a024ecd3939e5c10fe6a86ee3f0eea5093d533b7’
’3a0845737207f4eda221c9c9fb64e766ade9684562d8ba4f705f7ae6826886e5’
’c5ed9fa629f8f8dbf3bae4edbad4441c36df535088553fe82695c52d7bde30aa’
’de14363e9d4ed92848e524036d9e6b57b2d35cc77d377b7247c38111d2a3defd’
’4effac1186cc62617f44385415103021f72f674f8b8e26447fc1139c670090f6’
’64576021515c0a98b0aaf0a0ae02e0f5ebe8ee525b1e647ab68f369f81ecd846’)
Figure 12: Relevant parts of the PKGBUILD file for the OpenSSH package.
As this package receipt format was updated over time, our work also
includes a given version to the parser, in order to make this experiment
reproducible.
The creation of the test Blockchain work is divided into two different
pieces: Capturing and processing packages information and Constructing the
Blockchain.
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7.1.1 Capturing and processing packages information:
ArchLinux packages Git repository contains all the changes in every package
of the distribution. For every change, there is a new commit. A single commit
may also hold modification for different packages. Within the package recipe,
there are, among other things, the package name and version. There is no
package index; instead, there is the repository history.
By enumerating all the commits from the package repository, it was pos-
sible to parse the changes and identify the history of each package for later
inclusion in a Blockchain. In order to do that, a Python script was created
to iterate over all commits grabbing the differences. For every new package
change, the package recipe was parsed, and the ’version’ was saved, indexed
by the change date.
The process to extract data from the Git repository is I/O intensive, in
order to process the data within a reasonable amount of time a ramdisk2
was used. The process was not prompt, therefore splitting into two stages.
Once the data was sorted by date, the process to construct a Blockchain was
started.
7.1.2 Constructing the Blockchain:
In this experiment, we are simulating a Blockchain in which consensus will
be achieved among users that were added as part of the simulation as well.
The blocks generation will assume the block timestamp a date in the past,
respecting the time when the packages were created.
Four valid Trails were added to the simulation: archlinux, pypy, perl,
ruby, other Trails were also added. The full list of the Trails used on the
simulation is available at Table 3. To decide which package goes to which
Trail, there is a regular expression for each Trail. If the regular expression
matches the package name, the package is considered to be part of the Trail.
Notice that a package can be vouched for more than one Trail.
The vouch action is, naturally, placed after the addition of each package.
During the simulation, the vouch was programmed to happen from the next
block to four blocks ahead; The decision as to when to vouch for respects the
probability stated on Table 4
2ramdisk: File system created atop of the RAM. Reducing data seek time and increases
the throughput.
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(a)
Trail ( Regex )
archlinux (.*) perl (perl) pypy (py) ruby (rb)
(b)
Trails
ALTLinux Ark Linux BasicLinux BioKnoppix
CentOS Conectiva Cucumber Linux Debian Zenwalk Linux
Devil-Linux Dyne:Bolic Feather Floppix
Freesco Frugalware Gentoo Gnoppix
IPCop Kanotix Knoppix Kurumin
Linux Scratch Lycoris Manjaro Morphix
Pardus PHLAK Puppy Linux Red Hat Ent
SLAX Source Mage SuSE TopologiLinux
Turkix Univention Corp Whitebox Linux Yoper
Amigo Linux BackTrack BeatrIX BLAG
ClusterKnoppix CRUX DamnSmallLinux DeLi Linux
DragOnLinux Elive Fedora Foresight
Freespire G2Linx Goodgoat GoboLinux
IpodLinux Kate OS Kubuntu Linspire
Lunar Linux Mandriva MEPIS muLinux
PCLinuxOS PocketLinux Red Hat Slackware
SmoothWall Sun JDS SystemRescue TurboLinux
Ubuntu Linux VectorLinux Yellow Dog Xandros
Table 3: Regular expression used to check whether or not a package belongs
to a given trail. (a) Trails with custom regular expressions. (b) Trails where
the regular expression consists in the first four digits of the Trail name.
Block number Probability
N + 1 60%
N + 2 20%
N + 3 10%
N + 4 10%
Table 4: Probability when to vouch for a given package.
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The genesis block was generated using a timestamp 40 minutes before the
first data in the git repository, allowing the Trail ArchLinux to be created.
The interval between the block generation was chosen to be 20 minutes. A
change in this value can affect the size of the blocks.
Atop of the regular data that is part of the block, the simulation also
adds some metadata information, useful to understand the way in which the
consensus was achieved. Figure 13 contains an example of a block.
{
"forger": "Poppy",
"metadata": {
"amount_of_packages": 1, "amount_of_valid_trails": 4, "everybody_that_can_forge_this_block": [
{ "popularity": 38.60318029211056, "trails": [ "pypy" ], "user": "Ava" },
{ "popularity": 36.28520425873052, "trails": [ "archlinux" ], "user": "Poppy" },
{ "popularity": 13.26900777134668, "trails": [ "perl" ], "user": "Leo" },
{ "popularity": 11.842607677812248, "trails": [ "fal" ], "user": "Amelia" } ],
"popularity_at_generation": [
{ "name": "fal", "pop": 5.2051448090322765 },
{ "name": "archlinux", "pop": 39.20033948972628 },
{ "name": "perl", "pop": 15.810333717513881 },
{ "name": "pypy", "pop": 39.78418198372756 } ] },
"number": 150,
"packages": [ {
"package": {
"arch": [ "i686", "x86_64" ], "depends": "python", "license": [ "GPL" ],
"md5sums": "1af233c6fa0a68851bc6155b2f563c30", "name": "bzr",
"parser": "regexp v1.0", "pkgrel": 1, "pkgver": "1.3",
"pkgdesc": [ "A decentralized revision control system" ],
"source": "http://bazaar-vcs.org/releases/src/bzr-$pkgver.tar.gz",
"url": "http://www.bazaar-vcs.org" },
"publisher": { "name": "Pammi", "signature": "signature goes here" } } ],
"popularity": [
{ "name": "fal", "pop": 11.842607677812248 },
{ "name": "archlinux", "pop": 36.28520425873052 },
{ "name": "perl", "pop": 13.26900777134668 },
{ "name": "pypy", "pop": 38.60318029211056 } ],
"trails": []
}
Figure 13: Example of a Blockchain block inside the simulator
The educated values assumed for download numbers were expressed on
Table 5. Those numbers attempt to mimic the default behavior of a live
system. On the next section, it is explained how those numbers were com-
puted.
8 Results
The simulation of the Blockchain was fundamental to validate the proposal
of this work. Within the simulator, it is possible to validate the score on the
distribution popularity, and also to verify that all packages for ArchLinux
were there. Some of the packages have a significant delay to be published,
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Trail Minimum value Maximum value
archlinux 200000 300000
pypy 10000 400000
perl 100000 100500
ruby 100000 100900
others 0 100000
Table 5: Range utilized to simulate the number of confirmed downloads.
as expected due to block limitation on the number of packages. Figure 14
shows the delay on the OpenSSL publication.
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Figure 14: Delay to have the OpenSSL package available to the Trail users.
On Figure 15. It is possible to find different trials’ reputation during
the blocks generation. The reputation is consistent, in a sense that there
is no chance of unpopular Trails generating the Blocks, therefore limiting a
malicious user to create a new Trail, to somehow tamper the forgery of a
package.
It is also possible to notice that the distribution with less popularity did
not manage to forge any package; This shows that it is indefeasible to create
new Trails to tamper the Blockchain. Figure 16 summarizes all forge blocks.
The size of the Blockchain structure was not expressive, given the amount
of data stored. For production, the JSON format could be replaced with a
more optimal data. It is still interesting to keep JSON in the simulation
for the easy readability. Figure 17 illustrates the size of the Blockchain
increasing by each block.
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At Block 923 (Figure 18) one can observe the first time that the number
of published packages hits the block limit. Important to notice that most
popular users (given the fact that they are members for popular Trails) got
their packages published first. The others got the packages published on best
effort on the upcoming blocks. Figure 19 presents the amount of packages
on the Blockchain.
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8.1 Security Analysis
The Blockchain proposed in this work guarantees that the user will down-
load the package vouched for the distribution that he/she chose to trust, an
adversary will not be able to poison the Blockchain with ”trusted” packages
that could contain malicious software. To ensure that, the Blockchain has
the following features:
(a) All published packages are digitally signed. (b) All the vouch ac-
tions are digitally signed, ensuring: Authentication, Integrity, and Non-
repudiation. (c) The addition or removal of users as members of the Trails
are based on digital signatures as well. (d) The block is also signed with
the forgery digital signature. (e) The forgery is chosen upon popularity (as
demonstrated in the experiment). Therefore, keeping the most interested in
the correctness of the Blockchain as the responsible, to generate the next
Block. (f) Popularity is granted to verified downloads only.
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8.1.1 Creating the most popular Trail:
Technically it is feasible to create a new Trail that will be more popular than
the authentic ones. However, to do that, it will be necessary to have a more
significant amount of downloads than the authentic one, for quite some time.
Thus, the effort to tamper the Block generation increases proportional to the
importance of the authentic Trails, given its popularity.
8.1.2 Certificate hijacking:
It was not yet proposed a revoke mechanism. In case of a digital certificate
hijack, the attacker will be able to impersonate a Trail member.
9 Conclusion
Through simulation we have tried to demonstrate that the Blockchain con-
sensus was met as expected by the Blockchain members, together with the
prioritization of the most important packages.
The overhead given by the Blockchain utilization was not significant,
given the amount of data. There was however an average delay of 39 min-
utes on the publication of the packages to the end user. That delay was a
consequence of the Block generation and the posterior Vouch action.
The delay in the publication is acceptable as, normally the packages need
to be transmitted to mirrors which is likely to have the same or even bigger
delays.
The proof-of-download was proved to be efficient as effectively confirm
the download of the package, therefore producing consistent numbers on the
popularity of the Trails.
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